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Abstract 
In this paper, I try to estimate the impact of Structural Funds on the growth rates of Objective 1 
European regions during the two first programming periods (1989-2000). I develop a “hybrid” model 
of economic growth that partially endogenizes the rate of technical progress and I test its main 
implications following a panel data approach. The results suggest that Structural Funds have positively 
influenced the growth process of Objective 1 regions, although their impact has been stronger during 
the first programming period than the second. The same quantitative difference between the two 
programming periods appears in the estimated rates of β-convergence and the catching-up effect. 
JEL Classification: C23, E62, H50, O47 
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1.  Introduction 
  The main purpose of European Cohesion policy is to decrease regional 
disparities within the European Union. In accordance with the treaty, the Union 
works to “promote harmonious Development” and aims particularly to “narrow the 
gap between the development levels of the various Regions”. This principle implies 
that Objective 1 is the main priority. These regions have a GDP per capita below 
75% of the Community average and share some identical economic indicators: low 
level of investment, a higher than average unemployment rate, lack of services for 
businesses and individuals and poor basic infrastructure, among others. 
  Thus far, Structural policies seem to have been designed on the basis of three 
main assumptions: (i) gaps exist between EU regions, (ii) structural policies are able 
to reduce those gaps, and (iii) regional growth and convergence leads to cohesion. It 
is therefore crucial to evaluate the impact of Structural Funds in order to help the 
European Commission in the pursuit and planning of future policy to maximize its 
impact on economic development. In this paper, I propose a theoretical model of 
economic growth as a framework to evaluate empirically the impact of the Structural 
Funds programmes on the Objective 1 European regions growth process.  
  To check the Cohesion Policy effects, I test the equation derived from the 
model that relates the rate of growth of income per capita with the initial level of 
income per capita, the Structural Funds, the catching-up variable and the initial level 
of TFP. The sample is composed of forty-one Objective 1 European regions (NUTS 
2) during the two first programming periods of Structural Funds, which ran from 
                                                 
1 An earlier version of the paper was presented at Latin American Meeting of the Econometric Society 
(Chile, 2004) and XXIX Simposio de Análisis Económico (Spain, 2004). The author would like to 
thank Ramón María-Dolores and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. Contact: Dpto. de 
Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Campus de Espinardo 
30100, Murcia (Spain). E-mail: mcpuig@um.es. Tel: 34 968363734. Fax: 34 968363758.        180 
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1989 to 2000. The estimation is made by OLS using a panel data approach, where the 
use of fixed effects emerges endogenously from the structural specification of the 
model. 
  The results of the estimation show a positive effect of Structural Funds (SF, 
henceforth) on the Objective 1 regions´ rates of income growth over the period 
considered. However, the results are slightly different when we divide the sample 
into the two programming periods. In that case, we observe that during the first 
programming period, SF have had a clearer positive effect in the regions´ growth. 
The biggest difference between periods emerges when trying to measure the 
presence of the catching-up effect and the speed of convergence between regions. 
Both phenomena are very significant in the first period but almost null in the second. 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly presents the 
European Structural Funds Policy and the theoretical approaches to evaluate the 
impact of SF. Section 3 develops a “hybrid” growth model that partially endogenizes 
the rate of technical progress. Section 4 introduces some descriptive information and 
describes the data. Section 5 offers the main empirical results and finally, Section 6 is 
devoted to conclusions. 
2. Institutional setting and academic views 
  The European Union's SF are intended to help increase economic and social 
cohesion between Member States. The Funds' contributions have grown from 8 
billion euros per year in 1989 to 32 billion euros per year in 1999 and more than 2/3 
of the budget of the SF is allocated to helping areas which are lagging behind in their 
development. 
  The SF do not constitute a single source of finance within the European 
Union budget. They have their own specific thematic area. The European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF) finances infrastructures, job-creation investments, local 
development projects and aids for small firms. The European Social Fund (ESF) 
aims to prevent and combat unemployment as well as to develop human resources 
and promote integration in the labour market. The European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) supports rural development and improvement of 
agricultural structures. However, all of them work together to help economic 
activities in the regions take off by providing them with the basic infrastructure they 
lack, and by adapting and raising the level of human resources and encouraging 
investments in businesses. 
  For the period 2000-2006 the EU has placed a total of 195 billion euros at 
the disposal of SF. This figure accounts for approximately one third of the total EU 
budget. Some fifty Objective 1 regions, home to 27% of the European population, 
have received 137.80 billion euros, more than two thirds of the appropriations of the 
SF. 
  In the Second Progress Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (2003), the 
European Commission shows the calculations made in a previous work based on an 
input-output model to compute the expected economic impact of Objective 1 
assistance for the period 2000-06.
2 The estimations are that the total GDP in 
Portugal over the period will be 3,5% higher than it would have been without 
                                                 
2 The results of this work can be seen in:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/pdf/objective1/final_report.pdf  
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Community Support; for Greece the figure is 2,2% while in the Mezzogiorno it is 1,7%, 
in eastern Germany 1,6%, in Spain 1,1% and in Ireland is marginal. In all six areas 
combined, the overall impact of Objective 1 expenditure upon regional GDP 
averages 133%. 
  Later, the Third Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (February 2004) 
manifests that Structural interventions have boosted growth in the Cohesion 
countries. In Spain, GDP in 1999 is estimated to have been some 1,5% higher than it 
would have been without intervention, in Greece, over 2% higher, in Ireland, almost 
3% higher, in Portugal over 4,5% higher and in the new German Länder  around 4%. 
Structural intervention has also encouraged a growth of trade between Cohesion 
countries and other parts of the Union. However, the extent of convergence has 
varied markedly between regions, in large part reflecting their relative importance in 
the Member States in which they are situated. In those in the four Cohesion 
countries, which benefited from both substantial assistance and growth-oriented 
policies at national level, growth of GDP per head was much higher than in the rest 
of the EU. Outside the Cohesion countries, growth in Objective 1 regions has been 
less impressive, dragged down in part by slow national growth. 
  Overall, disparities have been falling across the EU since 1995. This fall has 
been more rapid between countries than between regions, with internal regional 
disparities in several Member States increasing. While growth has been generally 
higher in many of the least prosperous regions, it is noteworthy that the most 
prosperous regions have also performed well. Thus, the shares in total GDP 
accounted for by the least and the most prosperous regions both increased. In 2002, 
10% of population living in the most prosperous regions had a GDP per head of 
189% of the EU-25 average, while it was 36% in the 10% least prosperous ones. 
  As a result of the enlargement, disparity levels across the EU have 
dramatically increased. GDP levels also indicate widely differing regional situations 
within each objective, and there are also wide regional variations in growth rates. It is 
also to be noted that disparities in the EU between urban and rural areas generally 
increased as a result of enlargement. 
  The Cohesion Policy budget for the period 2007-2013 would amount to €308 
billion, equivalent to 0.37% of the GNI of the EU27. The new Member States would 
receive 51.3% of total cohesion policy resources, which on average, represent around 
3.5% of their GDP. 
  The new convergence objective (regions where GDP per head is less than 
75% of the EU average, 2000-2002) applies to 100 regions, accounting for just over 
35% of the EU 27 population. The new Regional Competitiveness and Employment 
objective (RCE) applies, in principle, to the rest of the Union (155 regions with 61% 
of the EU 27 population). The RCE regions collectively have relatively high GDP 
levels. However, growth remains weak in many regions and employment rates fall 
well short of the 70% target in most of them, which suggests that real needs persist 
throughout the EU. 
  Cohesion Policy has been recognized as a key instrument at the Community 
level, contributing to the implementation of the growth and jobs strategy. The 
Fourth Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (2007) shows preliminary 
estimates for the period 2000-2013 which suggest an increase in GDP compared to a 
baseline scenario without cohesion policy, of around 3,5% in Greece and 3,1% in 
Portugal and larger ones for the new Member States (2004-2013): 9,0% in the Czech 182 
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Republic and Latvia, 8,5% in Lithuania and Estonia, 6% in Bulgaria and Slovakia, 
and 5,5% in Poland. In addition, it is estimated that by 2015 around 2 million 
additional jobs will be generated due to these levels of investment. 
  The Commission has developed new instruments to assist Member States 
and the regions to improve the quality of projects. Specific initiatives have been 
developed to promote financial engineering for start-ups and micro-enterprises 
combining technical assistance and grants, with non grants instruments such as loans, 
equity, venture capital or guarantees: JEREMIE for the promotion of SMEs and 
microcredit and JESSICA for urban development. These actions will be undertaken 
through cooperation between the Commission and the European Investment Bank 
Group and other International Financial Institutions. 
  In September 2005, the Council adopted the new regulation on rural 
development with three main objectives: to improve the competitiveness of 
European agriculture and forestry by supporting restructuring, development and 
innovation; to improve the environment and the countryside by supporting land 
management; and to improve the quality of life in rural areas and encourage 
diversification of economic activity. The new rural development policy will be 
financed by a single fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development 
(EAFRD), and will no longer be part of Structural Funds, but both policies will work 
together to support the economic diversification of rural areas. 
  As part of the new governance cycle of the Growth and Jobs Strategy, the 
Annual Progress Report (APR) adopted in January 2006 several recommendations 
relevant to cohesion policy. First, it recommended that Member States ensure that 
Community cohesion and rural development spending is targeted toward supporting 
the Lisbon Strategy. Secondly, the APR highlighted the need for stronger efforts to 
develop coordination mechanisms between those responsible for the national reform 
programmes and those preparing the cohesion policy programmes. Thirdly, the APR 
stressed that Member States should take into account the macroeconomic impact of 
transfers from cohesion policy resources, and finally, recommended that the new 
generation of cohesion policy programmes reflect the priorities contained in the 
National Reform Programmes and the four priority actions: 1) investing more in 
knowledge and innovation; 2) unlocking the business potential, particularly of SMEs; 
3) responding to globalization and ageing; 4) moving towards an efficient and 
integrated EU energy policy. 
  According to the programming documents available for the Fourth Report 
on Economic and Social Cohesion (May 2007), the proportion of resources that have 
been "earmarked" for the key investments linked to the renewed strategy for Growth 
and Jobs (R&D and innovation, renewable energies, energy efficiency, eco-
innovations, human resources) in the EU-27 is on average, 61,2% under the 
Convergence Objective and 76,7% under RCE Objective. Overall, around €200 
billion will be allocated to these investments (an increase of more than €50 billion 
with respect to the previous period). 
2. 1 The growth approach: theoretical perspectives 
  The “growth” approach is particularly appropriate to study the impact of SF 
because the Funds Programs are designed to enhance the accumulation of 
production factors that affect the growth rate of the recipient economies. From a 
theoretical perspective, growth models provide different insights into the effects of  
 
Mari Carmen Puigcerver-Peñalver, The Impact of Structural Funds Policy 
 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
183
public assistance and infrastructures. In the context of a neoclassical Solow growth 
model, regional funds would finance a greater level of physical capital, which would 
correspond to a higher steady state income. However, due to the decreasing marginal 
product of capital, the investment rate declines towards the steady state income, 
where the stock of capital per person is constant. Thus, a higher investment rate in 
poorer regions may increase the convergence speed to rich regions, but only 
transitionally since it does not raise the growth rate in the long run. See for example 
Boscá, Doménech and Taguas (1999) who obtained favourable results (they found 
that EU transfers have contributed decisively -mainly by increasing the public capital 
stock- to reducing differences in income per head in the Union). In contrast, 
endogenous growth theories grant public policies an important role in the 
determination of growth rates in the long run. For instance, Aschauer (1989) and 
Barro (1990) predict that if public expenditures are considered an input in the 
production function, then policies financing new public infrastructures should 
increase the marginal product of private capital, hence fostering  capital accumulation 
and growth. An application of this approach to evaluate the impact of Structural 
Funds in some European Union countries is contemplated in Pereira (1999). 
However, there is enough evidence that an important fraction of observed 
productivity disparities across regions cannot be traced back to differences in factor 
stocks, but in total factor productivity (TFP) differentials. Henceforth, they play an 
important role in completing the account of growth and explain the evolution of 
disparities across regions (or countries). Thus, the dynamics of technical efficiency is 
a crucial issue that should be explored within a suitable framework. 
  A large part of the empirical literature related with economic growth in 
countries or regions concentrates on studying the issue of convergence. In the 
particular case of European regions, we find different results concerning the impact 
of SF on the speed of convergence of assisted regions. To cite an example, García-
Solanes and María-Dolores (2002) find that the absolute β-convergence between the 
European regions receiving funds during the period 1989-96 is 2,5%, smaller than 
between countries during 1989-99 which is 8,6%. However, taking into account the 
SF they receive, the speed of convergence grows to 3,8% for the regions and 15,18% 
for countries. 
  On the side of non positive effects, Boldrin and Canova (2001) should be 
mentioned. These authors examined changes in the statistical distribution of several 
kinds of factor productivities and income per head of the EU regions during the 
period 1980-92, and found that economic performance of the assisted regions was 
not very different from the rest of the Union. For them, the important implication is 
that the European regional and structural policies are based on political (as opposed 
to economic) motivations. 
  In this paper, I develop as a framework to study the impact of SF a 
“structural hybrid” model of growth which extends the one commonly used in the 
literature by partially endogenizing the rate of technical progress. Indeed, similar 
“hybrid” models have been used previously in the literature [see Benhabib and 
Spiegel (1994), de la Fuente (1995), de la Fuente (2002a) among others]. In the 
model, I assume that technological progress in an economy evolves as a consequence 
of two complementary forces: (i) the exogenous mechanism of technological 
diffusion across countries or regions, the so-called catch-up effect which implies that 
the less developed economies can increase their technology level faster than the more 184 
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advanced ones, since it is easier to copy existing technologies than to invent new 
ones, and (ii) an endogenous component coming from public policy. Public expenses 
in activities that enhance productivity can be considered as crucial determinants of 
the evolution of regional (or countries) TFP levels. In particular, SF can enhance the 
TFP on several fronts. The ERDF resources are mainly used to cofinance 
infrastructure and productive investments leading to the creation or maintenance of 
jobs. In practice, all development areas are covered: transport, communication 
technologies, energy, research and innovation, social infrastructure, training, etc. The 
ESF promotes the return of the unemployed and the incorporation of disadvantaged 
groups to the labour force, mainly by promoting equal opportunities in accessing the 
labour market, improving education and training systems, promoting a skilled 
workforce, boosting human potential in the field of research and development, etc. 
The EAGGF finances rural development measures such as investments in 
agricultural holdings (modernization, reduction in production costs, product quality, 
etc.), aids for the setting up of young farmers and vocational training, processing and 
marketing of agricultural products, and development of rural areas through the 
provision of services, encouragement for tourism, etc. All these programs work 
together in an attempt to provide a fertile ground for technological progress and, 
consequently for growth and development in European regions. 
3. The model 
  In this section a “hybrid” model of economic growth is developed. The term 
hybrid is used in the sense that technological growth is happening as a consequence 
of both, exogenous and endogenous forces. The endogenous component focuses on 
the SF that the European Union allocates to the less developed European regions, 
since the aim of SF is to ameliorate their productive capacity. The exogenous 
component is the catch-up effect. The model extends the one commonly used in the 
literature in the way described below. 
  Technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production function with 
constant returns to scale. 
                                       , ) (
1 α α α
t t t t t t t k L A L A K Y = =
−                                     [1] 
 
where  t k =Kt /(At Lt ) is the capital/labour ratio in efficiency units of labour, Lt is the 
labour force that grows at an exogenous and constant rate n, and At is a technological 
index which evolves over time following the equation, 
                                               , ) (
1
0
.
γ γ − = f A S A t t t                                          [2] 
 
where S represents Structural Funds which are a fixed fraction θ of the regions GDP 
per capita
3 
                                            ,
α ϑ ϑ t t
t
t
t k A
L
Y
S = =                                          [3] 
 
and  f0=A0l/A0i is the catch-up factor, which measures the initial technological 
distance between one region i and the leader l. 
                                                 
3 Note that the European authority fixes the fraction θ following its own criteria. For example, larger 
values of θ for poorer regions.   
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  Substituting (3) in (2) we get the rate of technological progress as a function 
of θ, f0 and k , 
                                                  ,
1
0
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γ αγ γ ϑ
− = = f k
A
A
g t
t
t
t                                  [4] 
 
  The household sector is the usual one in these models. The representative 
individual solves the following problem,  
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∞ −
∫
. .
1
max
0
1
 
 
where C is consumption per capita, L is population or the size of dynasty and σ is the 
inverse of the intertemporal substitution elasticity. 
  Solving this problem in the standard way, we obtain the dynamic system of 
the model from which we derive the steady state values of capital (k
*) and the growth 
rate (g
* ),
4  
.
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  To explore the transitional dynamics we will use the saddle path solution of 
the log-linearized system, which is given by, 
                                            ( )( ) 0
*
0 ˆ ˆ 1 ˆ ˆ k k e k k
t
t − − = −
−β .                             [5] 
where k ˆ=lnk . 
  Taking into account that ŷ= ln y= αk ˆ, from equation (5) we can derive an 
expression for the rate of growth of income per capita, 
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 Replacing  ŷ0=ln(Y0/L0)-lnA0 and inserting region sub-indexes, this expression 
becomes,  
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  To make use of a panel data approach in the estimation, equation (7) must be 
rewritten as,  
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4 The details of the derivation of the model can be followed up in the Appendix A. 186 
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where ln Ait=ln Ai0+gi t and s is a fixed number of years. Note that sub-index t refers 
to the initial value of each subperiod.
5 
 Substituting  ln Ait , we have: 
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  Using Taylor's Theorem and doing some algebra, ŷi
*  and gi may also be 
expressed as linear functions of θi  and fi.
6  
  Finally, assuming the same β for all regions, we obtain the following linear 
equation which is ready to estimate,  
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uit is an error term. 
  This equation is an expression that relates the rate of growth of income per 
capita of each region with the received Structural Funds and the catch-up variable, as 
well as the initial values of income per capita and the TFP, Ai0. 
  The data and the estimation results are described in the following sections. 
                                                 
5 This panel data formulation is obtained by moving from a single cross-section spanning the entire 
period to cross-sections for the several shorter periods that constitute it. We may note that equation 
(7) was based on approximation around the steady state and was supposed to capture the dynamics 
towards the steady state. It is, therefore, valid for shorter periods as well. 
6 See Appendix A, for the corresponding expressions.  
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4. Data and descriptive analysis 
4. 1 Data sources and variables 
  The sample is composed of regional data in EU15 including those regions 
chosen as Objective 1 during the two first programming periods of European 
Structural Funds (1989-93 and 1994-99). I consider a total of forty-one European 
Regions.
7 
I focus the analysis on Objective 1 regions for three main reasons: First, because 
Objective 1 is the main Objective of the European Cohesion Policy, not only during 
the two programmes considered in this study but also during the subsequent ones. 
Secondly, because Objective 1 regions receive the majority of funds: more than 2/3 
of the SF budget. Thirdly, because the conclusions derived from the empirical 
analysis including the poorest regions which also are the largest receptors of 
European Funds, should offer relevant information about the impact of SF policies 
to use in the elaboration of the subsequent programmes. This is an issue of 
increasing importance following the enlargement of EU, since almost the totality of 
population in the new Member States live in regions where GDP per inhabitant is 
below 75% of EU average, and they will receive an increasing proportion of the 
European Cohesion Policy funds. 
  I took the data of GDP per inhabitant in PPP units from the Eurostat New 
Cronos Regio database. The amount of SF is taken from the European Commission 
(1999)  Sixth Periodic Report on the Social and Economic situation of the regions of the 
Community. I use annual rates of growth of GDP per capita from 1989 to 2000 and I 
build the catch-up variable as the ratio between the GDP per capita of the European 
Union and each region at the beginning of each sub-period. I choose the EU as the 
leader economy since the reference used by the European Commission to measure 
gaps and convergence across regions and/or countries always is the EU average. 
  To measure the role of SF on economic growth I consider three different 
variables: 
1.  The total annual amount of SF divided by GDP per capita 
2.  The percentage of Funds received by each region with respect to the Funds 
received by all Objective 1 regions 
3.  The total annual amount of Funds 
  All of these are measured at the beginning of each sub-period. Moreover, I 
also take the Funds split in ESF, ERDF, and EAGGF. 
  The main reason to test the model with three different measures of SF is to 
improve the robustness of the results. I use two “relative” measures: the ratio 
Funds/GDPpc, which measures the weight of Funds with respect to the regions' 
wealth, and the proportion of the total Objective 1 Funds received by each region, 
which measures the weight of the region in the SF budget. I also use the “absolute” 
                                                 
7 The sample is composed of the following NUTS2 regions. For Belgium: Hainaut. For Germany: 
Bradenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhaltz. For Spain: Galicia, Asturias, 
Cantabria, Castilla León, Castilla La Mancha, Extremadura, Comunidad Valenciana, Andalucía, 
Murcia, Ceuta y Melilla, Canarias. For France: Corse, Goudaloupe, Martinique, French Guiana, 
Reunion. For Italy: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna. For 
Netherland: Flevoland. For Portugal: Norte, Centro, Lisboa e Vale do Tejo, Alentejo, Algarve, 
Açores, Madeira. For United Kingdom: Northern Ireland. For Greece and Ireland the entire county 
are considered as regions because their Structural Funds are not dissagregated by NUTS2 level. 188 
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value of Funds since it could capture a scale effect of the Funds. The amount of 
funds could be relevant in itself, since we may think that probably, the investments 
with the strongest impact on growth are largely costly, independently of the size of 
the region
8. 
  Furthermore, I introduce some other variables in the different regressions, 
measuring the national expenditure related to the SF because part of the investments 
are cofinanced by public or private national resources. The variables considered at 
regional level are: the public national expenditure, the private national expenditure 
and the sum of both, measured in absolute terms and as a proportion of the regional 
GDP. The notation used is described in the box below. 
 
Growth  annual growth rate of GDP per capita in PPP units 
y0  initial value of GDP per capita in PPP units 
catch  catch-up variable 
ESFgdp  ratio of annualized ESF/GDP per capita 
ERDFgdp  ratio of annualized ERDF/GDP per capita 
EAGFFgdp  ratio of annualized EAGGF/GDP per capita 
FUNDSgdp  ratio of the sum of the three Funds/GDP per capita 
ESFEU  % of the annualized ESF over the ESF received by all Obj. 1 regions 
ERDFEU  % of the annualized ERDF over the ERDF received by all Obj. 1 regions 
EAGGFEU  % of the annualized EAGGF over the EAGGF received by all Obj. 1 regions 
FUNDSEU  % of the sum of Funds over the sum of Funds received by all Obj. 1 regions 
totalESF  total annualized amount of ESF 
totalERDF  total annualized amount of ERDF 
totalEAGGF  total annualized amount of EAGGF 
totalFUNDS  the sum of the three previous Funds 
TNE  total public national expenditure by region 
PF  total private national financing by region 
NF  national financing by region =TNE+PF 
TNEGDP  TNE/GDP 
PFGDP  PF/GDP 
NFGDP  NF/GDP 
X.t  Variable X multiplied by the tendency 
 
  I performed the exercise over three different sub-samples corresponding to 
three different periods. The first one takes the period 1989-2000. The second and 
third consider the two programming periods separately. I made this distinction for 
one main reason: if the programmes are different in the total amount of resources, 
their allocation among regions, and in the period of time they are executed then, their 
effects could also be different. So, it is useful to check whether this expected 
difference appears in the data. 
4. 2 Descriptive analysis 
  A preliminary view of the data shows that the allocation of SF among 
European regions is inversely correlated with their starting GDP per capita levels as 
we can see in Figures 1 and 2. According to the Cohesion Policy aim of helping the 
more backward regions, this is what we should expect. However, there is scarce 
                                                 
8 I have considered the ratio Funds/GDP per capita, since this variable could be closer to the aim of 
the SF allocation in favour of backward regions according to their GDP per capita levels. I have also 
considered the ratio Funds/GDP (which is more standard in the literature) but the empirical results 
are very similar to that obtained using the variable Funds/GDPpc, so to save space, I do not report 
them.  
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evidence of a nearly proportionate relationship. Some backward regions have 
received amounts of SF per GDP similar to less depressed regions. 
  The regression line slopes make it evident that in the first programme of SF 
the redistribution is smaller than in the second. Although the financial redistribution 
through the SF has increased, it still remains very imperfect.
9  
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9 The redistribution is larger among Objective 1 regions. The equation line regression is y= -5,9551x + 
74,801 (R2=0,3307). 190 
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Furthermore, Figure 3 shows the evolution of the average GDP per capita for 
Objective 1 and non Objective 1 European regions (EU 15) and their respective 
standard deviations, and Figure 4 shows the evolution of the proportion of regional 
GDP per capita with respect to the EU15 (EU 15=100).
10 
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10 To facilitate the comparisons to the reader, I overlap the years 1995 and 1996 calculated with both 
the data offered by Eurostat using the previous and the current methodology (available since 1995).  
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  There are significant differences between subperiods and groups of 
regions. Firstly, we observe that during the First programming period (89-94), the 
annual growth rate of the average GDP per capita of Objective 1 regions was 
smaller (3,96%) than for the other regions (4,34%) but the growth rate of the 
standard deviation of GDP pc was also smaller (4,94% vs 7,54%). The same 
difference appears for the annual rate of growth of the ratio GDP per capita/EU 
15 (0,33% vs. 0,70%) but the standard deviation decreases in Objective 1 regions 
(-1,52%) and increases among the remaining regions (3,91%). However, during 
the Second programming period (95-00) the average Objective 1 GDP pc grows 
faster (5,73%) than the average non Objective 1 (4.93%), but its standard 
deviation grows even more (8,4% vs. 6,03%). Moreover, the annual rate of 
growth of the ratio GDP pc/EU is 0,58% for Objective 1 and -0,22% for the rest 
of regions, but the growth rate of the standard deviation in Objective 1 is 3,25% 
and 0,88% for the others. Therefore, we observe that during the first 
programming period, the standard deviation of the Objective 1 distribution goes 
down from 1990, but during the second programming period it begins to go up. 
However, the remaining regions exhibit almost the opposite behaviour. 
 
5. Estimation results 
  To analyze the effect of the European Union Structural Funds on the 
growth rates of Objective 1 regions, I estimate equation (10) by OLS following a 
panel data approach where the use of fixed effects emerges endogenously to 
capture the value of Ai0, which is not observable but is fixed along the period and 
particular for each region. 
  Before going through the effects of SF, in Table 1, I present the results of 
a simple exercise to estimate the speed of convergence of Objective 1 regions 
during the period 1989-2000.  In the above section of Table 1, only one constant 
term is introduced as a common element and no other variable that distinguishes 
between different steady states, so the estimation of β can be interpreted as an 
approximation to the speed of absolute convergence. However, in the section below 
the regressions include fixed effects by region. In this case, the estimated β values 
could be interpreted as an approximation of the speed of conditional convergence 
since fixed effects could be capturing differences in the regions´ steady states.
11 
The results indicate that absolute convergence exists during the period (7.03%) and, as 
we should expect, it is smaller than conditional convergence (9.67%).
12 
  To separate the effect on growth of convergence due to decreasing returns 
on capital from the catching up phenomenon, it is also necessary to consider the 
catch up variable.
13 However, by construction, the variables y0 and catch are highly 
                                                 
11 The concept of conditional  β-convergence provides a measure of the speed at which each region 
approaches its position in a stationary distribution characterized by regional inequality. Note that if 
economies have very different steady states, this concept is compatible with a persistent high degree 
of inequality among economies. However, absolute  β-convergence can be interpreted as a summary 
indicator of the strength of the tendency towards the reduction of inequalities.  
12 The previous convergence literature always predicts that the speed of convergence estimated with 
fixed effects is larger than without them. 
13 The concept of β-convergence is linked to the neoclassical growth model, which predicts that the 
growth rate of a region is positively related to the distance that separates it from its steady state. 192 
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correlated, so it makes no sense to introduce both in the same regression (see 
columns 2, 3 and 4 in Table 1). In the light of the model, however, to measure 
the catch up effect we have to look at coefficient φ5, catch-up multiplied by the 
tendency (catch.t), because it measures the catching up effect during the transition 
to the steady state, when the catching up process is more relevant.
14 In the 
estimation with the constant term the variable catch.t is not significant, but on 
considering the fixed effects, not only the catch-up becomes very significant but 
the speed of conditional convergence grows to 24.07% (see column 4 in Table 1). 
The difference comes from the fact that the absence of fixed effects in the 
estimations, leads to a problem of omission of relevant variables which biases the 
estimation of the initial income and the catch-up coefficients. Note that, by 
definition, the catch-up variable is related to the state of each region, Ai0 which is 
also correlated with the initial value of income per capita, so, in the estimation, 
the absence of Ai0 means that the coefficient of the initial income becomes less 
negative and the coefficient of the catch-up less positive. 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Sample period: 1989-2000. Dependent variable: Growth 
Estimation by OLS 
c  0.6920 
3.55 
-0.0446 
-1.78 
-0.2406 
-0.99 
0.7676 
3.62 
-0.0376 
-1.59 
y0  -0.0679 
-3.27 
 0.0189 
0.83 
-0.0771 
-3.37 
 
catch   0.0674 
3.88 
0.0806 
3.24 
 0.0676 
3.89 
catch.t      0.0011 
1.62 
-0.0008 
-1.28 
β ˆ   7.03%    8.02%  
2 R   0.1270 0.1956 0.1947 0.1332 0.1986 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
y0  -0.0921 
-4.44 
 0.0363 
2.19 
-0.2139 
-6.72 
 
catch   0.1374 
7.36 
0.1676 
8.16 
 0.1457 
8.22 
catch.t      0.0065 
6.26 
0.0009 
1.90 
β ˆ   9.67%     24.07%  
2 R   0.2528 0.4403 0.4476 0.3926 0.4460 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
Mean dependent variable: 0.0589  S.D. dependent variable: 0.0502 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 Note that the coefficient φ2 captures the effect of the catch-up factor on the steady state values of 
y and g since it corresponds to the term between brackets in equation 9 (φ2 is the sum of two 
opposite components so its sign is not defined). However, the coefficient φ5 corresponds to the 
term gi.t  which captures the transition to the steady state.   
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 García-Solanes  and  María-Dolores (2002) estimate the absolute  and 
conditional β- convergence rate for the EU12 countries over the period 1989-99 
and the EU12 regions over the period 1989-96, also using a panel data 
approach with annual growth rates. They obtain that absolute β-convergence is 
8.6% between countries and 2.5% between regions.
15 But, conditional convergence 
rates grow to 16.91% for countries and 17.9% for regions. On remaking the 
exercise of convergence for Objective 1 regions along the period 1989-1996, 
the rates of absolute and conditional convergence obtained are 12.5% and 19.98% 
respectively. So, during this period, Objective 1 regions converge much faster 
than the overall set of EU12 regions do. 
  These preliminary results show that the exogenous component of 
growth that the model proposes is active in Objective 1 regions in the period 
1989-2000. On the other hand, to test the effects of SF, the sign of the 
coefficient φ4 (corresponding to the term gi.t in equation 9) will tell us if their 
impact on growth is positive or negative, since the theoretical model clearly 
predicts its sign. It includes the funds variable multiplied by the tendency.
16 
  Tables 2 to 4 show the results of the regressions for the period 1989-
2000.
17 
18 In Table 2 we observe that when national financing (NF) is 
introduced into the regression the FUNDSgdp v a r i a b l e  i s  p o s i t i v e  a n d  
significant.
19 
20  In the same way, we see in Table 3 that the variable 
FUNDSEU is also positive and significant.
21 Finally, in Table 4, the coefficient 
of the variable of totalFUNDS is positive and significant in all regressions.
22 
The absence of significance of the funds variable observed in some 
regressions of Tables 2 and 3 could be caused by the high correlation between 
the initial income and the “relative” measures of funds, which biases their 
estimates.
23 However the total amount of funds is much less correlated with 
the initial income so, as we see in Table 4, its coefficient is more efficiently 
estimated. 
                                                 
15 Dall´rba and Le Gallo (2003) obtain a rate of absolute β-convergence of 1.98% for a sample of 145 
European regions during the period 1989-99 using a cross-section approach. 
16  φ4 captures the effect of SF in the transition to the steady state, while the coefficient φ3, 
corresponding to the term between brackets in equation (9), captures the long run effect. 
17 Appendix B gives the regressions including each fund (ESF, ERDF, EAGGF) separately. 
18 For the sake of space I only report the results with the variables NF and NFGDP. The regressions 
with the national public and private expenditures variables (TNE and PF) are available upon request. 
19 Note that, by construction, the variable NF is less correlated with the variables of funds/GDP per 
capita than NFGDP, so the estimation of the coefficient of the fund variable is more efficient. 
20 Table B1 (Appendix B) shows that when NF is included, ERDF and EAGGF are also significant 
and ESF is positive but not significant. 
21 Table B2 (Appendix B), shows that when NF is included, ESF, ERDF and EAGGF are also 
significant. 
22 Table B3 (Appendix B) shows that ESF, ERDF and EAGGF are also significant in all regressions. 
23 Note that as we saw above in Figures 1 and 2, the allocation of Funds (%GDP) among regions is 
inversely related to the initial value of their GDP per capita. 194 
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Table 2 
Sample period: 1989-2000. Dependent variable: Growth 
y0  -0.2202 
-7.13 
-0.2071 
-6.57 
-0.1888 
-4.67 
FUNDSgdp  -1.4614 
-4.80 
-1.1629 
-3.43 
-1.1676 
-2.18 
NFGDP    -0.0837 
-0.14 
 
NF     -4.1E-06 
-0.11 
FUNDSgdp.t  0.0169 
1.02 
0.0139 
1.03 
0.1265 
3.16 
NFGDP.t    -0.1318 
-1.99 
 
NF.t     -6.2E-06 
-1.59 
catch.t  0.0086 
7.83 
0.0093 
11.96 
0.0076 
5.52 
β ˆ   24.87% 23.20%  20.92% 
2 R   0.4457 0.6190 0.4605 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
 
 
Table 3 
Sample period: 1989-2000. Dependent variable: Growth 
y0  -0.2113 
-6.75 
-0.2077 
-6.54 
-0.1785 
-4.80 
FUNDSEU  -0.0084 
-4.01 
-0.0049 
-2.39 
-0.0086 
-4.13 
NFGDP    -0.5069 
-0.88 
 
NF     2.2E-05 
0.93 
FUNDSEU.t  -7E-06 
-0.04 
4.1E-05 
0.28 
0.0013 
4.33 
NFGDP.t    -0.1066 
-1.61 
 
NF.t     -1.1E-05 
-3.17 
catch.t  0.0079 
7.34 
0.0087 
11.67 
0.0073 
6.27 
β ˆ   23.74% 23.28%  219.66% 
2 R   0.4416 0.6098 0.4826 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
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Table 4 
Sample period: 1989-2000. Dependent variable: Growth 
y0  -0.2061 
-6.66 
-0.1959 
-6.18 
-0.1728 
-4.69 
totalFUNDS  -0.0002 
-5.14 
-0.0001 
-3.46 
-0.0002 
-3.35 
NFGDP    -0.0558 
-0.09 
 
NF     7E-05 
1.96 
totalFUNDS.t  9.5E-06 
4.50 
6.8E-06 
3.43 
2.2E-05 
6.29 
NFGDP.t    -0.1327 
-2.01 
 
NF.t     -1.4E-05 
-3.46 
catch.t  0.0082 
7.71 
0.0088 
12.08 
0.0073 
6.06 
β ˆ   23.08% 21.81%  18.98% 
2 R   0.4596 0.6213 0.4853 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
 
  On the other hand, we see that the catch.t variable is positive and significant in 
all regressions and its coefficient is larger than in the previous estimation without the 
SF variables. Moreover, the initial income variable appears as negative and significant 
in all regressions. The reported estimations of the speed of convergence range from 
20% to 25%, not far from the 24.07% obtained in Table 1. So, the conditional 
convergence process of Objective 1 regions does not seem to be greatly affected by 
the impact of SF.
24 Whereas, the SF could have more influence in the catching-up 
process. 
  In the light of the results, the effect of SF as an engine of growth has been 
positive along the period 1989-2000. However, due to the importance of SF it is 
necessary to try to get a more accurate result and to discern whether their impact on 
growth is equally important over the two programming periods. Thus, I divide the 
whole sample period into two sub-samples, corresponding to both programming 
periods. 
  I start with the results of the convergence and catch-up exercise. Table 5 
shows that during the first programming period, the absolute  β-convergence rate is 
around 15%, and the conditional β-convergence rate increases to 28.42%, and 46.13% 
when the catch.t variable is introduced into the regression. These values indicate that 
the speed of convergence, both absolute and conditional, during the first 
programming period is the double that during the whole period. 
  In Table 6 we observe other important differences. On the one hand, the 
adjusted R-squared is larger, reaching values between 0.7 and 0.9 versus the previous 
ones around 0.5. On the other hand, and more importantly, all measures of SF are 
positive and significant and the size of their coefficients is larger than in the previous 
                                                 
24  This weak impact of Structural Funds on the convergence rate of European regions is also 
obtained by Dall'erba and Le Gallo (2003) using a spatial econometric analysis. 196 
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estimations.
25 This means that the first Structural Funds Program (1989-1993) had a 
stronger and clearer impact on the growth rates of Objective 1 Regions. 
 
Table 5 
First Programming period. Dependent variable: Growth 
Estimation by OLS 
c  1.3625 
4.39 
-0.0793 
-2.69 
-0.2784 
-0.33 
1.3451 
4.29 
-0.0770 
-2.66 
y0  -0.1416 
-4.23 
 0.0197 
0.23 
-0.14 
-4.17 
 
catch   0.0896 
4.49 
0.1009 
1.84 
 0.0945 
4.27 
catch.t      0.0013 
0.61 
-0.0021 
-0.89 
β  15.27%    15.08%  
R2  0.2653 0.2965 0.2908 0.2619 0.2975 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
y0  -0.2474 
-6.6 
 -0.1184 
-2.74 
-0.3695 
-7.21 
 
catch   0.1943 
6.36 
0.1186 
3.29 
 0.1849 
6.30 
catch.t      0.0074 
3.86 
-0.0017 
-1.28 
β ˆ   28.42%    46.13%  
2 R   0.632 0.6454 0.6599 0.6392 0.6461 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
Mean dependent variable: 0.0662  S.D. dependent variable: 0.0657 
 
Table 6 
First Programming period. Dependent variable: Growth 
y0  -0.3774 
-7.45 
-0.2940 
-4.28 
FUNDSEU  0.1232 
0 
0.0943 
0 
NFGDP    0.0034 
0.09 
FUNDSEU.t  0.0013 
3.67 
0.0006 
4.08 
NFGDP.t    0.0052 
1.53 
catch.t   0.0078 
3.44 
0.0064 
2.99 
β ˆ   47.39% 34.81% 
2 R   0.7094 0.9058 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
   
                                                 
25 Note that the estimation with the variables of %Funds/UE and Total Funds are equal because 
%Funds/UE are a linear transformation of the Total Funds variables. I report the results 
corresponding to the %Funds/UE variables, except for EAGGF since in that case the matrix is 
singular (see Table B4  in Appendix B).  
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  Lastly, Tables 7 and 8 show the results corresponding to the second 
programming period (1994-2000), which differs from the former in several ways. 
Firstly, in Table 7 we observe that the exogenous forces of growth seem to be much 
less active or even inexistent.
26 Absolute convergence is inexistent and conditional 
convergence as well as the catching-up are not significant. 
 
Table 7 
Second Programming period. Dependent variable: Growth 
Estimation by OLS 
c  -0.1679 
-1.25 
0.0691 
3.58 
-0.4757 
-1.26 
-0.1875 
-1.46 
0.0675 
3.37 
y0  0.0232 
1.65 
 0.0517 
1.47 
0.0246 
1.81 
 
catch   -0.0117 
-0.85 
0.0258 
0.78 
 -0.0204 
-1.51 
catch.t      0.0005 
0.41 
0.0011 
0.89 
β ˆ        
2 R   0.0147 0.0007 0.0150 0.0091 0.0018 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
y0  0.0241 
1.28 
 0.0794 
2.83 
-0.0640 
-0.97 
 
catch   0.0644 
0.94 
0.1857 
2.07 
 0.1062 
1.43 
catch.t      0.0040 
1.49 
0.0023 
2.42 
β ˆ        6.62%  
2 R   0.0  0.0493 0.0996 0.0996 0.0868 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
Mean dependent variable: 0.0520  S.D. dependent variable: 0.0268 
  
  In Table 8, we see that the adjusted R-squared are very low, between 0.03 and 
0.05. This means that the independent variables have a very small explanatory power 
of the growth rate of Objective 1 regions during this second period. However, the 
FUNDSEU variable (when taking into account the national financing) is the only 
variable that remains significant. Moreover, the coefficients of the y0 and the catch.t 
variables preserve the correct sign and their estimated coefficients are slightly larger, 
but in neither regression are significant.
27 
  The comparison of results between the two programming periods shows that 
the positive impact of SF on the growth rates of Objective 1 European regions 
appears in both, in the former it even seems to be stronger. However, there is a large 
difference in terms of convergence and catch-up, because both phenomena are null 
in the second period but very important in the first. This last result is in agreement 
with the slow down in the convergence process of Objective 1 regions that we saw 
above in Figures 3 and 4 when looking at the evolution of the standard deviation of 
GDP per inhabitant. 
                                                 
26 Note that the variable y0 only becomes negative in the estimation with fixed effects when the 
variable catch.t is introduced into the regression, but neither is significant. 
27 Table B5 (Appendix B) shows the results with ESF, ERDF and EAGGF. 198 
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Table 8 
Second Programming period. Dependent variable: Growth 
y0  -0.0736 
-1.05 
-0.1063 
-1.40 
FUNDSEU  0.0221 
0 
0.0276 
0 
NF    -0.0027 
0 
FUNDSEU.t  0.0002 
0.86 
0.0014 
3.13 
NF.t    -9.7E-06 
-2.79 
catch.t  0.0031 
1.10 
0.0048 
1.51 
β ˆ   7.64% 11.23% 
2 R   0.0342 0.048 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
  
  To finish the section devoted to the results derived from the estimation of 
equation 10, it is important to remark that the coefficient φ1 including the variable of 
funds (without multiply by t) captures the long run impact on growth of SF since it 
corresponds to the term between brackets in equation (9).
28 This coefficient is the 
sum of two opposite sign components: the positive contribution comes from the 
expression of gi
* and the negative from ŷi
*, so the theoretical model does not predict 
its sign. We see that in most estimations, the estimated values are negative, which in 
terms of the model implies that the impact of Funds on the long run level of income, 
ŷi
* is larger than on the long run growth rate, gi
*. 
6. Conclusions and the future cohesion policy  
  The European Union's Structural Funds are intended to help increase 
economic and social cohesion between Member States, and constitute an important 
instrument for reducing regional imbalances and differences in economic 
development. 
  Since the resources devoted to SF constitute a very important part of the EU 
budget, and Objective 1 regions are the main priority of the European Union's 
Cohesion policy, it is necessary to closely follow the impact of SF on the trajectory of 
growth and convergence processes of these regions during the subsequent 
programming periods. This is even more important after the enlargement of the EU, 
since 90% of population in the new Member States live in regions with GDP per 
head below 75% of the EU average and over two-thirds live in regions where it is 
under half the average. 
  It is equally important to make the analysis under the adequate theoretical 
framework. While far from being the only one, in this paper I have proposed a 
reasonable “hybrid” model of economic growth, which allows us to interpret the 
                                                 
28 Note that the coefficient φ4 captures the impact of SF in the transition to the steady state. In the 
light of the model, a positive sign means that the SF contribute positively to growth.  
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estimated coefficients and then to analyze the effects on growth of the SF, as well as 
to distinguish between the trend to converge (which is called β-convergence) and the 
catching-up effect that also influence the growth rates of the regions. 
  In the light of my results, the SF have had a significant impact on the rates of 
growth of the Objective 1 regions during the first programming period. However, 
during the second program, the evolution of these regions is worse in terms of 
convergence, even if the impact on growth of the SF still remains significant. 
  Furthermore, what we observe when looking at Figures 3 and 4 for the 
period 2000-2004 (latest available data) is an increase in the different performances 
exhibited by Objective 1 and non Objective 1 regions in the EU15. The period is  
characterized by a slowing down in the annual growth rate of the average GDP per 
capita in both groups of regions (2,93% and 2,99% respectively compared to 5,73% 
and 4,93% during 1995-2000). However, the annual growth rate of the standard 
deviation of regional GDP per capita sensibly differs: in Objective 1 regions it is 
almost the double that in Non Objective 1 (5% vs 2,82%). This difference between 
groups of regions is stronger when comparing the average percentage of income per 
head with respect to EU15. In Non Objective 1 regions, the average GDP per capita 
grew at an annual rate of 0,26% while in the period 1995-2000 the rate was negative 
(-0,005%) and in Objective 1 the rate is 0,21% but in the previous period was 0,58. 
On the other hand, the standard deviation has grown at an annual rate of 0,09% in 
Non Objective 1 and at 2,28% in Objective 1 regions. 
  These data point to a very different evolution in Objective 1 regions, which 
were major recipients of support under cohesion policy, especially during the last 
decade. Therefore, to look for the origins of these different performances it becomes 
necessary to improve the design of European cohesion policies and the allocation of 
resources to achieve better effectiveness in all regions. 
  Furthermore, after enlargement, disparities within the EU have dramatically 
increased, likewise increasing the need for funds to combat them. Population of the 
Union has grown from 380 to 454 million (EU 25) or 485 million (EU27). In 
convergence objective it rises from 84 million to 123 million. As a result, GDP per 
head has dropped by -12,5% in EU25 and -18% in EU27, and disparity levels have 
risen (as an example, in 2003 GDP per head in Latvia was 41% of the EU average 
while in Luxembourg it was 215%). 
  However, it is among the new Member States where fastest growth and most 
rapid catching up are visible. The GDP of the three Baltic States has almost doubled 
over the decade 1995 to 2005. Poland, Hungary and Slovakia have also performed 
well with growth rates of more than double the EU average. But due to very low 
starting points for GDP per capita, and assuming the current growth rates, it seems 
likely that it will take more than 15 years before Poland and, especially, Bulgaria and 
Romania will reach a GDP per head of 75% of the EU 27 average. 
  In any case, the experience from the two former programmes of Structural 
Funds within the EU15 regions suggests that, without taking into consideration the 
differences between countries and regions and the international context, placing high 
expectations on the ability of SF to reduce gaps between regions quickly, could be 
misplaced. 
  The reform of cohesion policy in 2006 for the period 2007-2013 maintains as 
its main aim the reduction of disparities between the Member States and regions 
through the concentration of resources on the less developed areas. The bulk will be 200 
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concentrated on the poorest regions and countries: whereas in 1989, 56% of available 
resources where allocated to the lowest income regions, at the end of the new 
programming period, the proportion will be 85%. The new Member States will 
receive just over 52% of the total over the period. However, in line with the new 
growth and jobs agenda and in the context of globalization, cohesion policy is 
putting increasing emphasis on improving the competitive position of regions in the 
world economy. Thus, resources are focused on all the regions coping with structural 
adjustments and on investment with a particular emphasis on the cluster of activities 
around research, innovation, the information society and business development. 
Cohesion policy will pursue the same growth and jobs agenda everywhere, but with 
the intensity of support from the Union reflecting the needs and available resources 
of Member States and regions. 
  This reform of objectives is accompanied by a better regulation based on 
simplification (number of financial instruments, stages of programming, financial 
management and control). 
  New challenges that Europe as a whole should confront are particularly 
relevant to cohesion policy since they have an uneven impact on Europe's territory 
and may widen social and economic disparities. To face the challenge of 
globalization, virtually all regions are confronted with the need to restructure, 
modernise and facilitate continuous knowledge-based innovation. Many regions 
both, in the more prosperous and in the new Member States have a high share of 
employment in traditional sectors where competition from the emerging Asian 
economies is high. In these regions competition based on cost factors is not a viable 
option, they need to modernise and diversify their economic structure into high-
added value sectors by creating the conditions for business to adopt innovative 
processes, to cooperate with other enterprises and research institutes, to access risk 
capital and to internationalise their activities. 
  Many regions throughout Europe will be increasingly confronted with the 
asymmetric impact of climatic change. Challenges to agriculture, fisheries and the 
tourism industry in particular, may have disproportionate effects on disadvantaged 
groups, which might lack the means to adapt to them. Increased energy prices will 
also affect EU regions in different ways depending on their energy mix, economic 
structure and the energy efficiency of their firms. Increased transport costs tend to 
hit the geographically peripheral regions where key sectors, such as tourism could be 
vulnerable. Expanding renewable energies and investment in energy efficiency as well 
as the fight against climatic change provide major opportunities for most regions 
with new economic incentives through eco-innovation and the growth of 
environmentally friendly industries with a high local job potential. 
  Furthermore, demographic change and population decline put future 
employment growth at risk. In parallel, regions will have to cope with a number of 
social challenges posed by skill mismatches: labour market segmentation between 
high skills/high salaries and low skills/low salaries and increased immigration, against 
an environment where traditional security institutions are eroding since national 
policies face increasing difficulties in keeping up with the rapid pace of change 
imposed by these trends. 
  In this context, the goal of cohesion policy in the coming years should be to 
adapt to the new challenges European regions will face. On the one hand, how 
cohesion policy can better promote harmonious, balanced and sustainable  
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development taking into account the diversity of EU territories. On the other hand, 
how cohesion policy can become more effective in supporting public policies in 
Member States and regions, and given the need for efficient management of 
cohesion policy programmes, look for the optimum allocation of responsibility 
between the Community, national and regional levels within a multi-level governance 
system. 
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Appendix A 
  I present below the algebraic derivation of the model. 
The household sector solves the following problem:  
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The present value Hamiltonian for this problem is then,  
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  Solving the corresponding FOC, we obtain the standard equation for the 
evolution of consumption over time. 
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  To explore the system's transitional dynamics, we begin by log-linearizing it. 
Defining ĉ=ln c, and  k ˆ=ln k,  the system can be rewritten as 
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  Equalling both equations to zero and solving the system, we observe that the 
steady state is a saddle point and the stable root corresponds to the negative 
eigenvalue. Since the equilibrium trajectory of the model corresponds to the saddle 
path of the system, the speed of convergence toward the steady state will be 
determined by this negative eigenvalue. Let us denote by β the convergence coefficient. We 
will use the saddle path solution of the log-linearized system as an approximation to 
the equilibrium trajectory of the original system. Thus, the equilibrium path of k ˆ  is 
given by 
                                 ( )( ) 0
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Defining ŷ=ln y, we have that ŷ=αk ˆ and (3) becomes 
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In terms of income per capita and dividing by t we have 
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 Replacing  y0 by  0
0
0 ln ln A
L
Y
− , and inserting regions sub-indexes, equation (4) 
transforms into an equation that can be estimated, 
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  Note that, in principle, initial technology levels, technical progress rates, 
convergence coefficients and steady state ŷ levels could differ across regions. To 
specify these differences across regions let us go back to the model. 
 
  We start by writing equations (1) and (2) in a more compact way,  
), , (
.
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  Using the Taylor's Theorem, we approximate Φ(w, ξ) around the point (wl, ξl), 
where ξl  corresponds to the parameter vector of the leader and  wl  is its steady state 
value of (ĉ, k ˆ), 
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where Φ(wl, ξl)= 0, Φw(wl, ξl) is the Jacobian matrix and Φξ(wl, ξl) is the matrix of 
partial derivatives with respect to the policy parameters, both evaluated at the leader. 
 
 Setting  Φ(wl, ξl)=0 in (6), we can obtain an approximation of the steady state 
value for a given ξ, w
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where fl=1 and Bθ, Bf >0.
29 Therefore, 
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 Once  ŷi
* differs across regions depending on policy parameters, we turn back 
to (6) and rewrite it in terms of deviations of w from its own steady state,  
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  Note that this system has the same coefficient matrix Φw(wl, ξl) for all regions 
and therefore the same eigenvalues. Hence, as a first approximation, we can take the 
same value of β for all regions. 
  Finally, we can also rewrite the long run growth rate, g, as a function of the 
policy parameters in deviations to the leader, taking logarithms in equation (4) of the 
main text and using a linear approximation around gl= g(θl, fl), 
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  Now, we can rewrite the growth rate of income per capita in terms of policy 
variables and the catch-up factor, simply by substituting expressions (7) and (8) in 
equation (5). 
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30 Taking logarithms in equation (4), we have that: 
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  Taking derivatives in this expression, we obtain the values of gθ and gf . 206 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1 
Sample period: 1989-2000. Dependent variable: Growth 
y0  -0.1987 
-5.59 
-0.1832 
-4.31 
-0.1937 
-5.19 
ESFgdp  -7.2447 
-3.98 
  
ERDFgdp    -1.5049 
-1.86 
 
EAGGFgdp     -5.2154 
-3.36 
NF  2.2E-05 
0.73 
-2.4E-05 
-0.63 
-2.5E-05 
-0.90 
ESFgdp.t  0.2428 
1.14 
  
ERDFgdp.t    0.2216 
3.71 
 
EAGGFgdp.t     0.5218 
2.25 
NF.t  -5.9E-06 
-1.72 
-5.1E-06 
-1.26 
-3.7E-06 
-1.13 
catch.t  0.0083 
7.13 
0.0073 
5.40 
0.0078 
6.43 
β ˆ   22.15% 20.24%  21.53% 
2 R   0.4678 0.4586  0.4547 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
 
Table B2 
Sample period: 1989-2000. Dependent variable: Growth 
Y0  -0.1887 
-5.39 
-0.1746 
-4.46 
-0.1874 
-5.05 
ESFEU  -0.0099 
-4.82 
  
ERDFEU    -0.0084 
-3.84 
 
EAGGFEU     -0.0078 
-6.06 
NF  4E-05 
1.67 
9.5E-06 
0.38 
-3.6E-07 
-0.02 
ESFEU.t  0.0011 
4.55 
  
ERDFEU.t    0.0012 
4.28 
 
EAGGFEU.t     0.0011 
4.03 
NF.t  -1E-05 
-3.53 
-9.5E-06 
-2.75 
-7.6E-06 
-2.80 
catch.t  0.0076 
7.23 
0.0072 
5.97 
0.0075 
6.88 
β ˆ   20.91% 19.19%  20.75% 
2 R   0.4816 0.4804 0.4717 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent  
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Table B3 
Sample period: 1989-2000. Dependent variable: Growth 
y0  -0.1743 
-5.13 
-0.1722 
-4.36 
-0.1817 
-4.77 
totalESF  -0.0011 
-4.87 
  
totalERDF    -0.0003 
-2.77 
 
totalEAGGF     -0.0008 
-4.38 
NF  7.4E-05 
2.91 
3.6E-05 
1.00 
2.2E-07 
0.90 
totalESF.t  7.5E-05 
8.35 
  
totalERDF.t    3.3E-05 
5.05 
 
totalEAGGF.t     9.5E-05 
6.61 
NF.t  -1.2E-05 
-3.93 
-1.1E-06 
-2.80 
-9.9E-06 
-3.34 
catch.t  0.0077 
7.39 
0.0070 
5.62 
0.0074 
6.64 
β ˆ   19.15% 18.90%  20.06% 
2 R   0.4935 0.4760 0.4733 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
 
 
Table B4 
First Programming period. Dependent variable: Growth 
Y0  -0.2871 
-4.15 
-0.2977 
-4.35 
-0.2909 
-4.24 
ESFEU  -0.0923 
0 
  
ERDFEU    -0.0080 
0 
 
totalEAGGF     -0.1937 
0 
NFGDP  0.0079 
0.21 
0.0008 
0.02 
0.0057 
0.15 
ESFEU.t  0.0006 
3.81 
  
ERDFEU.t    0.0005 
4.03 
 
totalEAGGF.t     5.1E-05 
4.22 
NFGDP.t  0.0049 
1.44 
0.0053 
1.57 
0.0054 
1.61 
catch.t  0.0065 
3.07 
0.0063 
2.97 
0.0064 
3.00 
β ˆ   33.85% 35.34%  34.37% 
2 R   0.9053 0.9055 0.9062 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
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Table B5 
Second Programming period. Dependent variable: Growth 
y0  -0.1292 
-1.43 
-0.0923 
-1.28 
-0.0902 
-1.09 
ESFEU  0.0566 
0 
  
ERDFEU    0.0287 
0 
 
EAGGFEU     -0.1102 
0 
NF  -0.0034 
0 
-0.0023 
0 
-0.0029 
0 
ESFEU.t  0.0014 
2.46 
  
ERDFEU.t    0.0011 
3.55 
 
EAGGFEU.t     0.0009 
1.05 
NF.t  -9.3E-06 
-2.42 
-8.8E-06 
-2.86 
-5.4E-06 
-1.34 
catch.t  0.0058 
1.59 
0.0044 
1.42 
0.0040 
1.28 
β ˆ   13.84% 9.69%  9.46% 
2 R   0.04810 0.0476  0.0165 
Estimation by OLS with fixed effects by region 
Temporal dummies are included in all regressions 
t-statistics are White Heteroskedasticity-consistent 
 